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Dear Sirs:
The American Institute of Accountants, through its Committee 
on Federal Taxation, submits herewith recommendations for revi­
sion of the Federal tax laws which it believes should be considered 
and acted upon at this session of Congress. The Committee believes 
that there is urgent need for immediate consideration of these 
matters.
Traditionally, the Committee does not concern itself with tax 
rates or the rate structure. It has directed its attention to specific 
provisions of the statutes, and interpretations thereof, which have 
created gross inequities among taxpayers and taxpayer groups. 
These inequities on occasion are the result of application of statu­
tory provisions to unforeseen situations and circumstances. Some­
times they are the result of faulty draftsmanship or of judicial 
interpretations which seem at variance with Congressional intent, 
and sometimes they result from erroneous interpretations by the 
Treasury which can be rectified only by legislation.
Most of these recommendations have little budgetary signifi­
cance, but a few would have a substantial effect on revenue. How­
ever, in our opinion, the damage suffered from the situations to be 
corrected far outweighs the apparent cost of rectifying them. In 
some cases it is urged that the amendatory recommendations be made 
retroactive to all open years. In other recommendations it is re­
quested they be made effective only for the current and subsequent 
years.
The accounting profession is becoming increasingly concerned 
with variations between rules imposed upon taxpayers for the deter- 
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2mination of taxable income and principles developed by the account­
ing profession for the business community, in many cases with the 
cooperation and approval (and indeed sometimes under the man­
date) of Federal and State governmental agencies. Recommenda­
tions Numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are examples presented for remedial 
legislation. Controversies on accounting matters, so frequently con­
cerned merely with the fiscal period for recognition of income or 
deductions, have little long-range revenue significance directly, 
but they impose an enormous burden on the community and on the 
Treasury in time, manpower, and irritation. With the tax burden 
so heavy, as it must be, such “overhead” wastes are of vital concern.
The Committee desires to emphasize that, beyond the adoption 
of such technical corrections as the circumstances may indicate, 
there is a fundamental need for a complete overhauling of our 
Federal tax laws and a reconstruction and recodification along 
simple lines, expressing a permanent policy of Federal taxation, 
that would remove the necessity for continuous technical changes 
which make it difficult for taxpayers, practitioners, and adminis­
trators to obtain a working acquaintance with the law. Such an 
objective would include simplification of language as well as of 
technical structure.
Toward this end, the American Institute of Accountants has 
long urged the creation of a non-partisan commission composed of 
representatives of the legislative and administrative branches of 
Government, and of accountants, lawyers, and representatives of 
important economic groups which, free from consideration of cur­
rent legislative problems, could be expected to complete a job of 
this magnitude. The American Institute of Accountants continues 
to urge the establishment of such a commission.
The Committee’s recommendations made herein do not cover 
the whole gamut of items requiring legislative correction, but repre­
sent the results of the Committee’s study and research up to the 
time of this submission. Problems of revenue revision are receiv­
ing the Committee’s continuous attention, and from time to time, 
when further recommendations are formulated, they will be sub­
mitted to the Congress.
Respectfully submitted, 
Mark E. Richardson, Chairman 
Committee on Federal Taxation 
Thomas J. Green, Chairman 
Subcommittee on Current Tax 
Legislation
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Accounting for income tax purposes should be brought into closer 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles by enact­
ing legislation covering at least the four matters set forth below. 
[page 8]
(a) Prepaid income
Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles should be authorized 
in cases where such procedure is called for by the method of 
accounting consistently employed by the taxpayer.
(b) Accrual of property and other taxes
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in accord­
ance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently 
employed by them, ratably over the period for which the taxes 
are imposed.
(c) Apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee
Property taxes should be deductible by vendor and vendee of 
real property in the amounts apportioned to each in accordance 
with local practice or statute.
(d) Estimated expenses and losses
Deduction should be allowed for all estimated expenses and 
losses applicable, under generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples, to the income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of 
which can be established by the past experience of the company 
or of comparable companies or businesses, or by the facts of the 
situation.
2. Taxable income should not be attributed to gain on sale of a home if 
the proceeds of sale are reinvested in a new home within a reason­
able time after such sale, or if a new home is purchased within a 
reasonable time prior to such sale with the expectation that the 
proceeds are to be used for such purchase, [page 15]
3. Non-recognition of gain on involuntary conversions, provided in 
Section 112(f) of the Code, should be extended to replacements 
made in anticipation of the receipt of proceeds of the involuntary 
conversion, [page 15]
4. The definition of “fiscal year” should be extended to include annual 
accounting periods consisting of multiples of weeks instead of 
months (such as 13 four-week periods, etc.). [page 16]
5. Taxpayers should be given an annual option either to capitalize or 
to deduct currently expenditures for research and development, 
3
4such option to determine the future tax treatment of such expendi­
tures. [page 17]
6. Section 102 should be amended to provide [page 18]:
(a) At taxpayer’s option, dividends paid after the end of the tax­
able year, but before the due date (original or extended) of the 
tax return, should be allowed as a credit in computing undis­
tributed Section 102 net income.
(b) In the event of imposition of surtax under Section 102, the 
corporation should be permitted to relieve itself of such tax, 
in whole or in part, by a deficiency dividend under conditions 
and procedure now prescribed in Section 506 for personal hold­
ing companies, or, alternatively, by filing consent dividend 
papers, as provided in Section 28, effective as of the original 
taxable year.
(c) The excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term 
capital losses should be excluded from Section 102 net income.
7. The basis of property should not be reduced by excessive deprecia­
tion which resulted in no tax benefit. [page 20]
8. The limitations of Section 24(c) should not apply to deny deduction 
to an accrual basis taxpayer of unpaid expenses and interest if the 
person to whom the payment is made elects to include such payment 
in a taxable year beginning not later than the end of the taxable 
year of the payor during which the payment accrued, [page 22]
9. Where the holder of a mortgage or other debt forecloses on the 
security or collateral, and himself bids in the mortgaged or pledged 
property, the fair market value of the property thus bid in should be 
treated as a payment on account of the debt, and the deductibility 
and time of deductibility of the balance of the debt should be deter­
mined under the usual rules applicable to deduction of debts worth­
less in whole or in part. [page 22]
10. The right to the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of inventory 
(LIFO), denied to most retailers by discriminatory and improper 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, should be restored by appropriate legislation, 
giving the right to such retailers to use the Last-In-First-Out method 
of valuing inventory retroactively from January 1, 1941. [page 23]
11. Section 23(k) of the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to 
exclude from the definition of non-business bad debt those debts 
which arise in the course of a taxpayers’ trade or business, or which 
represent loans or advances to business organizations in which the 
5taxpayer has a financial interest, either as an employee, stockholder, 
or creditor, [page 24]
12. The method of taxing annuities should be revised so as to treat as 
income so much of each year’s annuity receipts as represents a 
ratable portion of the difference between the cost of the annuity 
contract and the aggregate of the annuity payments that would be 
received if the annuitant lived out his life expectancy as set forth 
in a standard mortality table. [page 25]
13. Partners and sole proprietors should be includible in pension and 
similar plans exempt under Section 165. [page 25]
14. The provisions of the Code with respect to interest on deficiencies 
and overassessments should be amended to provide for consistent 
treatment between deficiencies and overassessments. [page 26]
15. Section 322 (b)(3) should be amended so as to make it clear that 
the period of limitation on filing claims for refund and credit pro­
vided therein is an additional period in the event that the periods 
of limitation provided under Section 322 (b)(1) and (b)(2) have 
expired and also to make it clear that the period of limitation under 
(b) (3) does not supersede the periods of limitation under (b)(1) 
and (b)(2). [page 27]
16. The basis of property, acquired by gift but subjected to estate tax 
in the estate of the donor, should be the same as in the case of prop­
erty passing by death and not previously made the subject of a gift. 
[page 29]
17. When loss on the sale of property is disallowed by reason of the 
relation of the parties, the subsequent basis of the property for 
purpose of determining gain should be the transferor’s basis. 
[page 30]
18. In the case of employees’ stock purchase options, there should be 
treated as compensation income to the employee an amount equal 
to the spread between the option price and the market value at the 
time the option right becomes the property of the employee, or at 
the time the employee may first exercise the option, or at the time 
of exercise or sale of the option, whichever is the lesser, but in no 
event should such amount exceed the proceeds of sale of the option, 
if sold. Such compensation income should not be included in taxable 
income until the employee sells the stock or option, provided the 
option price is approximately equal to the fair market value of the 
stock on the date of the option agreement, [page 50]
19. Section 122(d) (5) provides (for taxpayers other than corporations) 
for allowance of losses in the computation of net operating loss 
6deduction only if they are attributable to the operation of a trade 
or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer. The Section should 
be amended to provide for recognition in the computation of net 
operating loss deduction of losses on disposal of assets used in a 
trade or business by a non-corporate taxpayer. Such losses on sales 
by the estate of a deceased taxpayer, and operating losses by the 
estate in conducting business, should be allowed as carry-backs to 
taxable years of the deceased. [page 32]
20. Recommendations with respect to personal holding companies. 
[page 33]
(a) Effectuation of deficiency dividends by consent dividend proce­
dure should be authorized.
(b) Deficiency dividend procedure should not be denied in cases of 
non-fraudulent delinquency in filing personal holding company 
tax returns.
(c) The deduction of the federal income tax, in computing undis­
tributed subchapter A net income, should be clearly stated to be 
the tax for the taxable year, whether the corporation is on the 
cash basis or the accrual basis.
21. The present double taxation of corporate income—once to the earn­
ing corporation, and again to the stockholders upon distribution of 
such income as dividends—should be mitigated and eventually elim­
inated. This double taxation has two aspects: (a) tax on intercor­
porate dividends and (b) tax on dividends paid to non-corporate 
shareholders without credit either to the corporation or to the share­
holder. The tax on intercorporate dividends should be eliminated. 
Non-corporate shareholders should be allowed a credit against indi­
vidual income tax of a percentage of dividend income equal to the 
initial combined rate of normal tax and surtax on individuals, such 
credit not to exceed the tax, otherwise determined, after applying 
the credits provided in Sections 31 and 32 but before applying the 
credit provided in Section 35 of the Internal Revenue Code. [page 55]
22. The 2 per cent additional tax applicable to consolidated returns 
should be eliminated, [page 36]
23. The "notch” provision under which corporate income between 
$25,000.00 and $50,000.00 is taxed at 53 per cent as compared with 
the 38 per cent applicable to income in excess of $50,000.00, should 
be eliminated, and all corporate incomes, regardless of size, taxed 
on a graduated rate scale up to $50,000.00 and at a flat rate there­
after, the rate applicable to any income bracket to be no greater than 
the flat rate, [page 36]
724. Where a corporation is formed or availed of to acquire the assets 
and become the successor, in a tax-free reorganization, of a pred­
ecessor corporation, which, in pursuance of the plan, is liquidated 
and dissolved, the successor corporation should step into the “tax 
shoes” of the predecessor corporation for the purpose of permitting 
carry-back and carry-forward of net operating losses from one to 
the other, and application of the tax benefit rule to recoveries by 
the successor on losses or deductions previously claimed or allow­
able to the predecessor, and so as to permit full deductibility by the 
successor of any payments or charges which would have been 
deductible by the predecessor had the predecessor continued in 
existence, {page 37]
25. For the purpose of Section 23(g) (4), which excludes from the capital 
loss category, loss from worthlessness of stock in a virtually wholly 
owned subsidiary of a domestic corporation, if more than 90 per 
cent of the subsidiary’s gross income for its entire history was from 
other than investment sources, gross income from the sale of mer­
chandise, stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to 
customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business, should be 
defined to mean “gross receipts” from such sales. [page 38]
26. A transfer of substantially all the assets of a corporation to another 
corporation should not be disqualified as a “reorganization” under 
Section 112(g)(1)(C) merely because the voting stock received in 
exchange is that of a parent company of the transferee corporation. 
[page 38]
27. The definition of reorganization in Section 112(g) should be broad­
ened to bring within its scope “spin-off” and “split-up” transfers. 
[page 39]
28. Recommendations re mitigation of effect of statute of limitations. 
[page 39]
8RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Accounting for income tax purposes should be brought into closer 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles by enacting 
legislation covering at least the four matters set forth below.
Ever increasing divergences between rules of accounting for 
tax purposes (as prescribed by regulations, rulings, and court deci­
sions), on the one hand, and generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples (as universally applied in determining net income for com­
mercial management and investment purposes), on the other hand, 
has been and continues to be the despair of businessmen, account­
ants, and tax practitioners alike. Such divergences not infre­
quently result in taxing as income what is actually capital. They 
are a continuous source of irritating adjustments of tax returns 
which, in the long run, yield no revenue to the government, because 
they merely represent shifts of income between years. The advan­
tages, in terms of simplicity, of maximum conformance of tax 
accounting with the accounting methods employed in the taxpay­
er’s accounting records, and in the preparation of his financial and 
credit reports, are self-evident.
There is no question but that it was the basic intention that 
generally accepted accounting principles be applicable for tax 
purposes, Thus Section 41 of the Code provides that
“The net income . . . shall be computed in accordance with 
the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the 
books of such taxpayer; but ... if the method employed does 
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made 
in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Com­
missioner does clearly reflect the income. ’ ’
The regulations (Reg. 111) provide:
“Although taxable net income is a statutory conception, it 
follows, subject to certain modifications as to exemptions and 
as to deductions for partial losses in some cases, the lines of 
commercial usage. Subject to these modifications statutory 
net income is commercial net income. This appears from the 
fact that ordinarily it is to be computed in accordance with the 
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books 
of the taxpayer.” (Sec. 29.21-1)
9“If the method of accounting regularly employed by him in 
keeping his books clearly reflects his income, it is to be followed 
with respect to the time as of which items of gross income and 
deductions are to be accounted for.” (Sec. 29.41-1) 
“Approved standard methods of accounting will ordinarily 
be regarded as clearly reflecting income.” (Sec. 29.41-2) 
“It is recognized that no uniform method of accounting can 
be prescribed for all taxpayers, and the law contemplates that 
each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems of account­
ing as are in his judgment best suited to his purpose.” (Sec. 
29.41-3)
The Supreme Court, in the leading case of U. S. v. Anderson, 
269 U. S. 422 (1926) in referring to the original statutory fore­
runner of the above quoted excerpts from Section 41, and to an 
early Treasury Decision to the same effect, stated:
“It [the Treasury Decision] recognized the right of the cor­
poration to deduct all accruals and reserves without distinc­
tion made on its books to meet liabilities, provided the return 
included income accrued and, as made, reflected true net in­
come ... It [the purpose of the statute] was to enable tax­
payers to keep their books and make their returns according 
to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income 
earned during a taxable period, the expenses incurred in and 
properly attributable to the process of earning income during 
that period.”
In this statement, the Supreme Court not only succinctly and 
accurately stated the primary objective of all generally accepted 
accounting principles—to have each accounting period reflect the 
income earned in that period and the expenses incurred in and 
properly attributable to the process of earning that income—but, 
what is even more important, recognized that it was the purpose 
of the taxing statute to give effect to these principles, and, to that 
end, to permit taxpayers “to deduct all accruals and reserves with­
out distinction made on its books to meet liabilities.”
However, in the twenty-four years following the Anderson 
decision, judicial interpretations of that decision and of the later 
decision in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S.
10
417 (1932), have resulted in distortions of and departures from the 
scientific accounting principles, recognition of which the Anderson 
decision had declared to be the purpose of the taxing statute.
These distortions and divergences have occurred chiefly in the 
four directions set forth below:
(a) Prepaid income:
Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with gen­
erally accepted accounting principles should be authorized in cases 
where such procedure is called for by the method of accounting con­
sistently employed by the taxpayer.
Payments received in advance for the use of property in future 
years or for services to be rendered in future years should be in­
cluded as income in the future years to which applicable and not 
in the year of receipt. This is well-recognized and established 
accounting procedure. It is only in this way that income such as 
rentals, publication subscriptions, and club dues, etc., can be clearly 
reflected by including the income in the period in which it is earned 
and in which are incurred the costs and expenses of earning it. In 
fact, until such expenses and costs are incurred in the future 
period, it cannot be known whether the advance receipts of ren­
tals, etc., will represent a net income or a net loss.
However, the Courts have held that income received in advance 
is nevertheless taxable in year of receipt, even where there is a con­
tinuing obligation to perform services and incur expenditures over 
a period of time in order to earn the income, and despite the fact 
that generally accepted accounting principles, and the accounting 
methods consistently employed by the taxpayer, call for the defer­
ment of the reporting of such income until the period or periods in 
which such income is earned by the rendering of the services and 
the incurring of related expenditures. This has created all sorts of 
absurd tax results, arising out of the basic difficulty that net in­
come is bound to be distorted if the income is required to be included 
in one period, while the related expenditures are included in a 
later period.
This distortion is accentuated by the fact that, in contrast to 
their treatment of income, the Courts require that expenses paid 
in advance or which benefit future periods be not permitted as
11
deductions in the year of payment or accrual, but only in the future 
years to which the expenses are applicable.
A striking example of such distortion occurs where a landlord, 
employing the accrual method of accounting, in order to finance 
the payment of the broker’s commission on a long-term lease, ar­
ranges for the payment in advance of rentals applicable to the last 
few years of the lease. The decisions have held that the rental thus 
received in advance must be included in taxable income in the year 
of receipt, whereas the broker’s commissions, which such advance 
rentals were intended to finance, may not be deducted in the year 
of payment, but must be spread over the life of the lease. In such 
cases the result frequently is an abnormally large and unreal tax­
able net income in the first year of the lease, and equally unreal 
losses in the last few years of the lease—not by reason of any actual 
variations in results of operations, but solely by reason of the arti­
ficial accounting procedure enforced for tax purposes.
Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles should be authorized in 
cases where such procedure is called for by the method of account­
ing consistently employed by the taxpayer.
(b) Accrual of property and other taxes:
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in accord­
ance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently em­
ployed by them, ratably over the period for which the taxes are 
imposed.
It is universally accepted accounting practice to regard taxes 
as an expense of the period for which levied. Thus if a property 
tax is imposed for the calendar year 1950, it is regarded as an ex­
pense of that calendar year, regardless of local peculiarities of 
assessment or lien dates, and if, for example, the taxpayer should 
be on a fiscal year ending May 31st, 5/12 of such tax would be in­
cluded as an expense for the year ended May 31, 1950, and 7/12 
would be included as an expense for the year ended May 31, 1951. 
Again, if a corporation franchise tax based upon the income of a 
given period should be imposed for the privilege of carrying on 
business for a future period, the accepted accounting practice 
would be to treat such tax as an expense of the privilege period 
for which the tax is imposed.
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Under the court decisions, however, it is held that accrual of 
a tax occurs upon the date when the amount and liability for the 
tax become fixed and that the entire tax is deductible on, and only 
on, that single date. Thus, in many jurisdictions, the amount and 
liability for a property tax for the calendar year 1950 would be 
fixed some time late in 1949, and, under such court decisions, would 
be deductible, on the accrual basis, only at that time, whereas in 
other jurisdictions, the amount and liability for the tax for 1950 
would not be determined until some time in 1950 and would be 
deductible only on that date. Where the income tax year of the 
taxpayer varies from the property tax year of the local jurisdic­
tion, many other peculiar variations ensue.
The result has been an utterly confusing pattern, in which 
deductibility of taxes varies from community to community, de­
pending upon the local peculiarities of assessment date, date of 
issuance of assessment rolls and tax warrants, lien dates, date upon 
which personal liability for the tax is determined, etc. In many 
cases, several property taxes on the same property may be deduct­
ible at different dates because of varying assessment and lien dates 
relating to the village, county, school, and other property taxes im­
posed in the community.
All of this serves no real practical purpose, since all that is 
involved is a shift of deductions between years. Consistency in 
practice and relation of expenses to the period for which imposed 
are the important factors in clearly reflecting income. The artifi­
cial rules created by the aforesaid court decisions are not even in 
accord with local practice (and sometimes local statute) with 
respect to the apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee, 
which is universally based on a prorating of taxes over the period 
for which imposed.
These comments are not intended to cover taxes, the liability 
for which is contingent, denied and contested by the taxpayer.
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consis­
tently employed by them, ratably over the period for which the 
taxes are imposed.
(c) Apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee:
Property taxes should be deductible by vendor and vendee of real 
13
property in the amounts apportioned to each in accordance with 
local practice or statute.
Local practice in all communities is to apportion property 
taxes between vendor and vendee, upon a sale of real property, by 
prorating the tax over the tax year for which the tax is imposed. 
In some cases, such procedure is provided by local statute. Such 
apportionment is made without reference to assessment dates, lien 
dates, existence of personal liability for the tax, etc., but is made 
wholly by reference to the tax year for which the tax is levied.
In many jurisdictions, however, a property tax for the calen­
dar year 1950 would, by reason of the local statutes, have been 
assessed and become a personal liability of the property owner and 
a lien upon the property on or before January 1, 1950. In such 
circumstances, the Supreme Court held, in Magruder v. Supplee, 
316 U. S. 394 (1942), that the vendee who purchases property, for 
example, after January 1, 1950—even on January 3, 1950—and, 
therefore, pays practically the entire 1950 tax, cannot deduct such 
tax, because it was not imposed upon him, but was a personal liabil­
ity of the vendor and a lien upon his property prior to the sale. 
The vendee, says the Court, is not permitted the deduction because 
the tax payment by him merely discharges an existing lien upon 
the property and is therefore a part of his cost. At the same time, 
however, the vendor may not deduct the tax because he did not 
pay it.
This is not only an artificial and distorted result, but does com­
plete violence to real estate practice which has been in existence 
long before the income tax came on to the statute books.
The statute should be amended to provide for deduction of 
property taxes by vendor and vendee in accordance with the 
amounts thereof apportioned to each, if such apportionment is 
pursuant to local practice or statute in that respect.
(d) Estimated expenses and losses:
Deduction should be allowed for all estimated expenses and losses 
applicable, under generally accepted accounting principles, to the 
income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of which can be 
established by the past experience of the company or of comparable 
companies or businesses, or by the facts of the situation.
In applying the basic principle of accounting for income, 
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namely, that of including expenses and losses in the period in which 
is earned the income to which they relate, it is generally accepted 
practice to provide by estimates for expenses and losses relating 
to the accounting period and which are reasonably determinable 
in amount. Such estimates, at least to the extent that experience 
and surrounding circumstances establish their reasonableness, 
should be allowed as deductions.
Thus, where accounts receivable are outstanding at the end of 
a period, it is accepted accounting practice to deduct the estimated 
loss for the cash discounts which, experience has shown, will be 
taken by the customers on payment. It has been held, however, 
that such a loss may not be deducted, because, until the customers 
actually pay the accounts, it is not known which customers will, and 
which will not, pay in time to be entitled to the discount—this, 
despite the fact that experience over a period of years may estab­
lish that, with comparatively little variance, a determinable per­
centage of the customers takes advantage of the discounts. Again, 
if merchandise is sold under a guarantee, or with an agreement to 
service or repair the product for a given period, past experience 
frequently indicates the amount of future repair and service ex­
pense, or losses on guarantees on such sales, with a high degree of 
accuracy, and proper accounting procedure would require that 
estimates for such future expenses and losses arising out of such 
sales should be deducted in determining the income realized there­
from. Nevertheless, for the same reasons as in the case of the cash 
discounts, such items are not allowed, and deduction therefor is 
not permitted until the period or periods in which the losses are 
sustained or the repair and service expenses incurred. Under these 
conditions, the taxpayer is always being subjected to tax on an 
amount of income, which, in fact, is not income, but capital.
Deduction of such losses is at present permitted by statute in 
the case of bad debts. The basis of such statutory authorization 
was generally accepted accounting practice.
This principle should he extended to estimates for all expenses 
and losses applicable, under generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples, to the income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of which 
can be established by the past experience of the company or of com­
parable companies or businesses, or by the facts of the situation.
This recommendation is not intended to be applicable to “Re­
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serves” as employed by special classes of taxpayers like insurance 
companies, nor is it intended to cover provisions for unrealized 
decrease in value of property, for contingencies, or for items the 
liability for which is contested by the taxpayer.
2. Taxable income should not be attributed to gain on sale of a home if 
the proceeds of sale are reinvested in a new home within a reasonable 
time after such sale, or if a new home is purchased within a reasonable 
time prior to such sale with the expectation that the proceeds are to be 
used for such purchase.
Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that if 
property held for productive use or investment is exchanged for 
property of a like kind held either for productive use in trade or 
business or for investment, no gain or loss shall be recognized. 
No gain is recognized in excess of the amount of money or other 
property received in exchange.
If an individual sells a home, because he is required to move 
to a new location or for some other reason, he cannot deduct any 
loss realized and further he must pay tax on gain realized regard­
less of the fact that he reinvests all of the proceeds of sale in a 
new home.
Section 112 should be amended to provide that no gain or loss 
shall be recognized if proceeds of sale of a home are invested in 
another home within a period six months prior to or subsequent to 
the date of sale, except to the extent that such proceeds exceed 
the amount invested in the new home. The provisions of Section 
113(a) (6) should be made applicable to determination of the basis 
for determining gain on sale of a home acquired under circum­
stances described above.
3. Non-recognition of gain on involuntary conversions, provided in Sec­
tion 112(f) of the Code, should be extended to replacements made in 
anticipation of the receipt of proceeds of the involuntary conversion.
Under Section 112(f), if property is involuntarily converted 
into money, as by fire and receipt of insurance proceeds, or by con­
demnation and receipt of condemnation award, no gain is recog­
nized, even if the proceeds exceed the adjusted basis of the prop­
erty, if the proceeds are used forthwith to replace the property with 
other property similar or related in service or use, or in the estab­
lishment of a replacement fund for that purpose. However, under 
the court decisions, this applies only if the particular moneys 
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received as proceeds of the involuntary conversion are expended in 
the acquisition of such similar property or in the establishment of 
a replacement fund. In many cases, months and sometimes years 
elapse between the time of the destruction or condemnation of the 
property and the receipt of the insurance proceeds or condemnation 
award. If, in anticipation of the receipt of such proceeds, the tax­
payer should spend an equivalent or greater amount in the acquisi­
tion of similar property, out of its own or funds borrowed for the 
purpose (to be replaced or repaid out of the conversion proceeds) 
the court decisions hold that the non-recognition provisions of Sec­
tion 112(f) do not apply. This defeats the underlying purpose of 
Section 112(f), since in most cases it is utterly impractical for the 
taxpayer to wait, and perhaps to suspend business operations, until 
the conversion proceeds are received.
Accordingly, this section should be amended to make it clear 
that replacements within the purview of the statute are governed by 
its provisions, even if made in anticipation of the receipt of the 
conversion proceeds. This amendment should be made applicable 
retroactively to all open years.
4. The definition of “fiscal year” should be extended to include annual 
accounting periods consisting of multiples of weeks instead of months 
(such as 13 four-week periods, etc.).
Use of four and five-week periods rather than monthly ac­
counting periods has been consistently followed by many trades 
and industries in an effort to make more accurate cost distribu­
tions, and financial comparisons, which would otherwise be dis­
turbed by use of months that vary from 28 to 31 days. It has been 
the only possible method of accurately reflecting costs in many in­
dustries and businesses. In certain businesses, such as meats, gro­
ceries and other retail stores, the packing industry, the baking in­
dustry, and others, merchandising is handled on a weekly basis, 
making weekly closing of accounts the only practicable procedure. 
A natural corollary of this method of accounting is for annual 
accounting on a thirteen four-week period basis, or by using twelve 
periods of which eight are four weeks in length, and four are five 
weeks in length. Under this procedure, determination of the end 
of the week, or the end of the year, is simply a matter of selecting 
the most practical day for closing. In most businesses, it is Saturday 
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night of the fourth week. In others, it may be a Monday night, etc. 
In these cases, an additional week is included in the annual period 
every five or six years in order to compensate for the difference 
between an actual year and 52 weeks. Such use of accounting- 
periods, consisting of multiples of weeks, is a common and gener­
ally accepted business and accounting practice.
Prior to the decision in the case of Parks-Chambers, Inc. (131 
Fed. (2) 65, affirming 46 B.T.A. 114), it had been understood that 
the Bureau approved this practice, provided it clearly reflected in­
come and was adopted in conformity with good business practice. 
Under said decision, use of the thirteen four-week period (or the 
indicated alternatives) is barred for tax reporting purposes. Use 
of such periods was held to mean that the taxpayer had not elected 
a fiscal year, because the selected period did not end on the last 
day of a month, with the result that, unless the thirteen four-week 
period just happened to end on the last day of a month, the calendar 
year must be used for tax purposes in utter disregard of the tax­
payer’s actual annual accounting period.
Such methods of accounting by which 52 consecutive weeks 
(and occasionally 53 weeks) are represented in each fiscal year 
should be approved. There is no practical reason to the contrary. 
It is a serious problem for long established businesses, whose ac­
counting methods have been repeatedly approved in Bureau exami­
nations, to have to alter methods of keeping books, reports to stock­
holders and credit agencies, cost accounting systems and other 
extremely detailed record-keeping processes.
The law should be amended retroactively to include within the 
definition of “fiscal year” any annual period consistently employed 
by the taxpayer, if the taxpayer uses the system of dividing its 
annual accounting period into four-week periods or four and five- 
week periods, instead of calendar months.
5. Taxpayers should be given an annual option either to capitalize or to 
deduct currently expenditures for research and development, such op­
tion to determine the future tax treatment of such expenditures.
In general, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct ordinary and neces­
sary expenses but not expenditures for improvements or better­
ments. Most taxpayers charge off all research and development 
expenditures against income as they are incurred. Some taxpayers, 
however, capitalize major expenditures for such purposes and 
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amortize the expenditures over a specified period, usually arbi­
trarily determined.
The Commissioner has often disallowed many of these expen­
ditures, treating them as capital expenditures, and the contro­
versy between taxpayer and Commissioner has to be settled by com­
promise because the attitude of the courts in such situations is un­
certain. Where the expenditure is capitalized by the taxpayer, 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the problem arises as to the 
period over which the capitalized items should be amortized or 
written off against income. The adoption of an established policy 
as to the treatment of research and development expenditures 
would be in the public interest.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Section 24(a) (2) be 
amended to provide that a taxpayer shall have the option either to 
capitalize or to deduct when incurred as an ordinary and necessary 
expense any expenditures for research and development except 
for a capital expenditure for tangible property. A separate option 
should exist for each year’s expenditures or for each research or 
development project, but once the option is exercised for any year’s 
expenditures or project it should be final. Where such expendi­
tures or projects are capitalized, the rate of amortization should 
be determined by the taxpayer, but once fixed as to a particular 
year’s expenditure it should be final for the year of expenditure 
and for future years unless the project is disposed of or abandoned.
Any capital expenditures incurred as a result of research and 
development of tangible property should be capitalized but in an 
amount not to increase the tax basis of such property above its fair 
replacement value or fair market value, whichever is lower. Where 
the property is subject to wear and tear, etc., such expenditures 
should be recoverable through ordinary depreciation rates under 
Section 23(1).
If a research or development project, or if resulting tangible 
property is disposed of or abandoned in a future year, the profit or 
loss on such disposal or abandonment should be treated in accord­
ance with Section 117(j).
6. Section 102 should be amended to provide:
(a) At taxpayer’s option dividends paid after the end of the tax­
able year, but before the due date (original or extended) of the 
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tax return, should be allowed as a credit in computing undis­
tributed Section 102 net income.
(b) In the event of imposition of surtax under Secton 102, the cor­
poration should be permitted to relieve itself of such tax, in 
whole or in part, by a deficiency dividend under conditions and 
procedure now prescribed in Section 506 for personal holding 
companies, or, alternatively, by filing consent dividend papers, 
as provided in Section 28, effective as of the original taxable 
year.
(c) The excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term 
capital losses should be excluded from Section 102 net income.
High corporate profits during the postwar period combined 
with high individual tax rates have unquestionably created some 
situations to which Section 102 should be applied. These are cases 
in which the accumulation of earnings in the corporation is clearly 
beyond all reasonable needs of the business and is motivated by a 
purpose to save taxes to the shareholders.
In many other cases, however, corporations with a temporary, 
highly abnormal liquidity find themselves under powerful silent 
pressure from Section 102 to pay dividends when considerations 
of normal business prudence would require conservation of these 
funds for additions to and replacements of facilities, expansion, 
protection against possible business decline, or other valid pur­
poses. With the return of competitive business conditions, the need 
for greater working capital is more evident (with prices far above 
prewar levels, inventories and receivables reflect dollar amounts 
far larger than prewar amounts, even for the same physical vol­
ume). The increasing tendency reflected in some court decisions to 
restrict justification for retention of earnings to business require­
ments which are imminent and definite, as well as the fact that the 
burden of justification of retaining earnings is on the taxpayer, 
exerts pressure toward unsound dividend policy. Directors, acting 
in good faith and using their best judgment, may find their judg­
ment held to be erroneous by the Commissioner or by the courts 
(who have the benefit of hindsight) and thus be exposed to minority 
stockholders’ actions.
This pressure and the uncertainty which it creates in the for­
mulation of sound business policy is the most unfortunate feature 
of the present situation.
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Under our present system of taxing dividends, the principle of 
Section 102 is undoubtedly necessary. It would appear that assur­
ance of a wise and sympathetic administration of the Section is 
equally necessary. Announcement of an administrative policy to 
apply Section 102 only in clearly flagrant cases, or where dividend 
history over a number of years clearly indicates tax-motivated non­
distribution of earnings, and that the taxpayer would receive the 
benefit of any reasonable doubt, might help considerably to relieve 
existing confusion and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, if the burden of proof is to remain on the tax­
payer and not be shifted to the Commissioner, then the taxpayer 
should be permitted to relieve itself of the imposition of the tax, 
in whole or in part, by the methods recommended. In that manner, 
the taxpayer would be permitted to take advantage of the same 
hindsight which is now available to the Commissioner and the 
courts.
Likewise, the application of the Section 102 surtax to long­
term capital gains is inequitable. Such income, when realized by a 
corporation, is taxed at the same maximum rate at which it would 
be taxed if realized directly by an individual. Thus, the income does 
not escape its proper tax burden by reason of being realized and 
accumulated by a corporation rather than by an individual. Since 
under existing law net long-term capital gains are not subject to 
the tax on undistributed net income imposed on personal holding 
companies, ordinary corporations should not be subjected to a 
greater burden. Finally, the Section should be amended so as not 
to apply to corporations whose stock ownership is broader than that 
stated in Section 501 relating to personal holding companies.
7. The basis of property should not be reduced by excessive depreciation 
which resulted in no tax benefit.
The requirement that excessive depreciation previously allowed 
be deducted in determining the basis of assets was included in the 
statute in order to prevent a taxpayer from obtaining a double de­
duction, with double tax benefit, of the same capital investment. 
However, that rule should not be applied if the excessive deprecia­
tion has resulted in no tax benefit. The reason for avoiding the 
inequitable result that formerly arose from the taxation of recover­
ies of bad debts and taxes, where no tax benefit had been obtained 
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from the original deduction, is equally applicable to excessive 
depreciation.
Section 113(b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
that, in determining the basis of property, “proper adjustment in 
respect of the property shall in all cases be made ... in respect 
of any period since February 28, 1913, for exhaustion, wear and 
tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion, to the extent 
allowed (but not less than the amount allowable) under this chap­
ter or prior income tax laws ...”
From the Bureau’s own instructions it appears that “where it 
is clearly evident that no taxable income will be developed,” the 
Bureau does not even attempt to judge whether the depreciation de­
ducted by taxpayers in loss years is properly allowable, but simply 
postpones examinations until years which show profits. Yet, when 
the Bureau eventually finds that the depreciation deductions taken 
were improper and excessive, it contends that its own failure to 
examine a “loss return” at the proper time constitutes an “allow­
ance” and approval of such improper and excessive deductions 
taken by the taxpayer.
The legislative history of Section 113(b)(1)(B) clearly dis­
closes that Congress introduced the distinction between “allow­
able” and “allowed” without any thought of changing the law in 
force prior to 1932, being intent solely upon codifying the already 
well-established equitable principle of estoppel. (See Sen. Rep. 
665, p. 29, 72nd Congress, 1st Session; H. R. Rep. 708, p. 22, 72nd 
Congress, 1st Session). However, where a past error had no con­
sequences at the time when it was committed, no inequity can 
have arisen, which would call for the application of any principle 
of estoppel. Where no tax would have been due even if the re­
turn had been correct, the Commissioner cannot obviously have 
“allowed” something merely by doing nothing.
Since the Bureau’s position has been supported by a five-to- 
four Supreme Court decision in Virginian Hotel Corporation of 
Lynchburg v. Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Rev­
enue (63 S. Ct. 1260), only remedial legislation can effectively 
correct the situation. Such legislation should provide that the ad­
justment for depreciation theretofore “allowed” should be for only 
such part of the depreciation deductions as reduced taxes other­
wise payable.
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8. The limitations of Section 24(c) should not apply to deny deduction to 
an accrual basis taxpayer of unpaid expenses and interest if the person 
to whom the payment is made elects to include such payment in a taxable 
year beginning not later than the end of the taxable year of the payor 
during which the payment accrued.
Section 24(c) disallows to a taxpayer on the accrual basis all 
deductions for unpaid expenses and interest which are payable to 
related interests who are on a cash basis unless the payment is 
made during the taxpayer’s taxable year or within two and one- 
half months after the close of such year. The purpose of this Sec­
tion is to prevent a taxpayer claiming a deduction for expenses 
or interest payable to a related interest where the latter is not re­
quired to include the items as income.
It has been held in a number of cases that the deduction was 
not allowable even though the related interest, on a cash basis, was 
required to include the expenses as income because “constructively 
received.”
Section 24(c), should be amended to provide that such section 
shall not apply where the person to whom the payment is made 
elects to include such payment in his return for a taxable year be­
ginning not later than the end of the taxable year within which 
the payor’s taxable year ends. This would be analogous to the 
consent dividend provision in Section 28.
9. Where the holder of a mortgage or other debt forecloses on the security 
or collateral, and himself bids in the mortgaged or pledged property, 
the fair market value of the property thus bid in should be treated as 
a payment on account of the debt, and the deductibility and time of 
deductibility of the balance of the debt should be determined under the 
usual rules applicable to deduction of debts worthless in whole or in part.
Under present Bureau regulations where a debtor bids in 
mortgaged or pledged property, the transaction is split into two 
elements: (1) the portion of the debt which was applied to the satis­
faction of the bid price is compared with the fair market value of 
the property, with resulting gain or loss—sometimes claimed to be 
capital gain or loss (in one case where not only principal, but also 
interest on the debt, was applied towards satisfaction of the bid 
price, the Supreme Court held that interest income resulted); 
(2) the deductibility of the balance of the debt, not applied to the 
bid price, is determined under the usual rules relating to debts 
worthless in whole or in part, depending upon whether there is en­
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forceable personal liability, other collateral, guarantees, etc. Par­
ticularly where it is claimed that the first element results in capital 
gain or loss, distorted results frequently ensue.
Actually all that has happened is that the debtor has received 
as against his investment in the debt, property having a certain fair 
market value, leaving the balance of the investment in the debt to 
be recouped. If worthless, this balance should be allowed as an 
ordinary bad debt deduction and should not be split artificially 
into two parts, according to the accident of the bid price, which, 
usually because of absence of competing bidders, frequently fails 
entirely to reflect true values or the realities of the situation.
10. The right to the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of inventory 
(LIFO), denied to most retailers by discriminatory and improper inter­
pretation of the Internal Revenue Code by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, should be restored by appropriate legislation, giving the right 
to such retailers to use the Last-In-First-Out method of valuing inven­
tory retroactively from January 1, 1941.
Remedial legislation is necessary to correct a discrimination 
against a large segment of American retail industry which has 
persisted since 1941. This injustice has resulted from an improper 
and discriminatory interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code by 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the right of retailers to 
the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of valuing inventory pro­
vided by Section 22(d) of the Code.
The Hutzler Brothers Company decision of the Tax Court, 
handed down early in 1947, invalidated the Bureau’s erroneous 
interpretation, but under regulations presently in effect, only those 
retailers who acted in contravention of the position of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue and contested such Bureau position are en­
titled to the elective method provided by Congress and confirmed 
by the Hutzler decision. Those retailers who obeyed the inter­
pretation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue have therefore been 
penalized.
The Bureau has recently denied relief to these taxpayers by an 
assertion that it (the Bureau) could not remedy this discrimina­
tion by administrative action. The Treasury has stated, “It has 
been concluded accordingly that no revision of the regulations . . . 
will be undertaken by the Department so long as the statutory pro­
visions involved are retained in their present form.”
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While retailers have been permitted, by reason of the revision 
of the Bureau’s regulations in 1948, to adopt the LIFO method 
from the year 1947 forward, the large group of retailers who were 
misled by the Bureau’s original erroneous position are not now per­
mitted to adopt the LIFO method retroactively to 1941 although all 
other types of taxpayers were permitted for the years 1941 through 
1946, inclusive, the use of the LIFO method.
Since the Bureau has now admitted the validity of the appli­
cation of the LIFO method to retail taxpayers, and has denied the 
right to retailers to use the LIFO method retroactively to 1941 
only because such taxpayers did not meet the statutory require­
ment pertaining to the reports to shareholders and creditors, and 
because such taxpayers did not meet the Bureau’s regulatory re­
quirements governing time and manner of election of method, such 
discrimination must be eliminated by giving to the discriminated- 
against retailers the right to use the LIFO method retroactively 
to January 1, 1941. If Section 22(d) had been fairly and properly 
interpreted by the Bureau in 1941, the discrimination against re­
tailers would not have taken place. To treat all taxpayers fairly, 
legislation should retroactively provide for LIFO for retailers to 
January 1, 1941.
11. Section 23(k) of the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to ex­
clude from the definition of non-business bad debt those debts which 
arise in the course of a taxpayer’s trade or business, or which represent 
loans or advances to business organizations in which the taxpayer has 
a financial interest either as an employee, stockholder, or creditor.
The present statutory definition of non-business bad debt has 
been interpreted by the Treasury Department to exclude those 
debts which arose in the course of a trade or business but which at 
the time of worthlessness are not directly connected with a trade 
or business of the taxpayer suffering the loss. Classification on the 
basis of circumstances when the debt was incurred would be a more 
equitable test.
Furthermore, considerable controversy and litigation has en­
sued as to the classification of bad debts incurred by employees and 
investors on loans and advances to business organizations by which 
they are employed or in which they have a financial interest. The 
present attitude of the Treasury Department puts a premium on 
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form rather than on substance, and inhibits necessary flexibility 
of business dealings.
The first part of the proposed amendment should be effective 
for debts becoming worthless after December 31, 1949, and the 
second part should be effective for all open years.
12. The method of taxing annuities should be revised so as to treat as income 
so much of each year’s annuity receipts as represents a ratable portion 
of the difference between the cost of the annuity contract and the 
aggregate of the annuity payments that would be received if the 
annuitant lived out his life expectancy as set forth in a standard mor­
tality table.
Under Section 22(b)(2), I.R.C., the taxpayer receiving an 
annuity is taxed on an amount equal to 3 per cent of the cost, the 
remainder being treated as a recovery of capital. Under this 
method of taxing annuities, the chance of recovering capital tax- 
free during the lifetime of a taxpayer is remote, particularly since 
most annuity contracts now in existence are based upon a lower 
interest yield than 3 per cent.
Section 22(b) (2), I.R.C., should be amended to provide that 
the principal of the annuity payments shall be computed by spread­
ing the cost of the annuity over the life expectancy beginning with 
the commencement of annuity payments and only that portion of 
each annuity payment which is in excess of that applicable to prin­
cipal shall be included in gross income.
13. Partners and sole proprietors should be includible in pension and similar 
plans exempt under Section 165.
Stockholder-employees, even when they are major or sole 
stockholders, can be included, subject to certain limitations, in 
pension plans qualifying under Section 165, contributions to which 
are currently deductible by the corporation, with no taxability to 
the participants in the plan until benefits are received. Subject 
to the same limitations, where the business is conducted as a part­
nership or proprietorship, the partners or proprietor should be 
eligible for inclusion in such plans. Under present law, a qualified 
plan must be for the exclusive benefit of employees, which includes 
stockholder-employees, but not partners or proprietors, since the 
latter are not employees. The statute should be amended to admit 
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partners and proprietors to participation in plans qualifying under 
Section 165.
14. The provisions of the code with respect to interests on deficiencies and 
overassessments should be amended to provide for consistent treatment 
between deficiencies and overassessments.
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with the 
allowance of interest on over assessments (refunds) contained in 
Section 3771 provide a general rule that interest on overpayments 
(overassessments) shall be allowed at the rate of 6 per cent:
(a) In the case of a credit; from the date of the overpayment 
to the due date of the amount against which the credit is 
taken, but if the amount against which the credit is taken 
is an additional assessment, then to the date of the assess­
ment of that amount.
(b) In the case of a refund; from the date of the overpayment 
to a date preceding the date of the refund check by not 
more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the 
Commissioner.
Although the income tax and the excess profits tax on corpora­
tions are correlative taxes computed for all practical purposes as a 
unit, they are as a general rule treated as independent taxes for the 
purpose of interest computations. As a result, the interest charge 
on a net deficiency of two related taxes is greater than the interest 
charge on a deficiency of the same amount in a single tax.
This inequity is illustrated by the following common example. 
Whenever there is an increase in excess profits tax with a corre­
sponding reduction in income tax or an increase in income tax with 
a corresponding reduction in excess profits tax and the original 
tax in each instance had been paid in quarterly installments, in­
terest adjustments are made as follows:
(a) Upon the deficiency, interest is computed from the date 
the original return was due, namely on the fifteenth day 
of the third month following the close of the calendar or 
fiscal year.
(b) On the other hand, interest on the overassessment is com­
puted from the time the tax was overpaid. If the entire 
overpayment is applicable to the last installment (Blair 
v. Birkenstock, 271 U.S. 348; C.B. V-1, 142), interest is 
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computed from the fifteenth day of the twelfth month fol­
lowing the close of the calendar or fiscal year. The tax­
payer, under the circumstances, is overcharged to the ex­
tent of nine months’ interest on the refund, purely on the 
basis of theoretical, if not arbitrary, bookkeeping.
In cases involving the filing of Form 874, interest should cease 
on the net deficiency—the excess of the deficiency over the over­
assessment—thirty days from the signing of the waiver and accept­
ance form. If it is necessary to file a revised form 874 with an in­
crease in the net deficiency, interest should accumulate only on the 
increase in the net deficiency. It should be unnecessary to file sep­
arate waiver or acceptance forms in respect to the deficiency and 
in respect to the overassessment. Although income taxes and ex­
cess profits taxes appear in separate chapters of the Internal Rev­
enue Code, they should be "deemed” a single tax for interest pur­
poses.
Legislation is required to clarify the conflict resulting from 
the Treasury’s interpretation of Section 3771(b)(1) and 292(a) 
where Form 874 is executed.
To prevent any abuse resulting from a long delay in tendering 
a refund check to the taxpayer, Section 3771(b)(2) should be 
amended so as to provide that if the Commissioner does not tender 
a check to the taxpayer within thirty days after the date of such 
check additional interest shall be allowed and paid.
15. Section 322 (b)(3) should be amended so as to make it clear that the 
period of limitation on filing claims for refund and credit provided 
therein is an additional period in the event that the periods of limitation 
provided under Section 322 (b)(1) and (b)(2) have expired and also to 
make it clear that the period of limitation under (b)(3) does not super­
sede the periods of limitation under (b)(1) and (b)(2).
Subparagraph (b)(3) was added to Section 322 of the In­
ternal Revenue Code by Section 169(a) of the Revenue Act of 
1942, applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
1941. The reports of the House Committee on Ways and Means 
and the Senate Finance Committee, in explaining the purpose and 
effect of Paragraph (b) (3), say that “subsection (a) of this Sec­
tion of the Bill adds paragraph 3 to Section 322(b) to give the 
taxpayer the right to file a claim for credit or refund during the 
extended period and during six months thereafter, in case an over­
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payment is discovered after the time for obtaining credit or refund 
of such overpayment under the provisions of Section 322(b)(1) 
and (2).” Paragraph (b)(3) as drafted and as it now appears 
in the Code provides that where a waiver under Section 276(b) has 
been given by a taxpayer, i.e., where an agreement is entered into 
between the Commissioner and a taxpayer to extend the period of 
limitation on assessment of a deficiency, the period of limitation 
on a claim for credit or refund expires within six months after the 
expiration of the extended period of limitation on assessment. This 
provision has been construed by the Bureau to supersede, in the 
case of a waiver, the periods of limitation provided in Paragraphs 
(b)(1) and (2). Such a construction is unquestionably contrary 
to the intent of Congress as stated in the Committee reports. The 
effect of such a construction can be and often has been so grossly 
inequitable as to be clearly illogical.
As an illustration of the inequity of the effect of Paragraph 
(b) (3) as construed and applied by the Bureau, consider the status 
of claims for refund filed by taxpayers A and B under the respec­
tive circumstances described below:
A History of Cases B
March 15, 1946 Return for 1945 filed March 15, 1946
March 1, 1949 Waiver under Sec. 276(b) filed, ex­
tending limitation on assessment 
until 6/30/49
None
March 30, 1949 Assessment made March 15, 1949
March 15, 1949 Regular period of limitation on as­
sessment expired
March 15, 1949
June 1, 1949 Additional tax assessed June 1, 1949
June 30, 1949 Additional tax paid June 30, 1949
January 3, 1950 Claim for refund filed June 30, 1951
The Bureau would regard A’s claim as filed too late because 
it was filed more than six months after the expiration of the waiver 
period, but would regard B’s claim as timely filed, because it was 
filed within two years after payment of the tax, although A coop­
erated with the Bureau by extending the period of assessment and 
although the taxes were both assessed and paid on the same date.
Such peculiar and inequitable results were certainly not con­
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templated by Congress; just as certainly such results are contrary 
to the intent of Congress.
Paragraph (b) (3) should be amended so as to leave no room 
for doubt that it grants an additional extension of the period of 
limitation for filing claims for credit or refund if the periods of 
limitation under Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) have expired; in 
other words, that the period of limitation on filing claims for 
credit or refund is the period under Paragraphs (b) (1) and (2) 
or the period of six months after the expiration of the waiver 
period, whichever is later. The amendment should be made retro­
active to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941, so as to 
make such retroactive effect contemporaneous with the effective 
date of Paragraph (b) (3) as originally added to the Internal 
Revenue Code.
It is significant that by Section 509(a) of the Revenue Act of 
1943, Congress granted an additional period of six months after 
the expiration of a waiver for taxable years as far back as years 
beginning after December 31, 1923, in instances where a tax could 
be assessed only by reason of a waiver. This means that a taxpayer 
who had given a series of waivers of limitation on assessment for 
1924 until June 30, 1949 could file a timely claim for refund of a 
tax on or before December 31, 1949, although the tax was paid in 
1925, while another taxpayer who had given a similar series of 
waivers but who paid an additional tax for 1924 on June 30, 1949, 
would also have to file a claim therefor within six months after 
payment. In the attempt to recognize the equities of the first tax­
payer’s position, Congress has unintentionally been inequitable to 
the other taxpayer.
16. The basis of property, acquired by gift but subjected to estate tax in the 
estate of the donor, should be the same as in the case of property passing 
by death and not previously made the subject of a gift.
In many cases all or some portion of property held by the 
decedent as a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety, and property 
previously transferred by the decedent by gift or in trust, is re­
quired to be included in the estate of the decedent for estate tax 
purposes.
If property is treated, for estate tax purposes, as though it 
had passed on death, the basis thereof for income tax purposes 
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should be the same as if it had passed on death, namely, the value 
at which subjected to estate tax. Under present law, though sub­
jected to estate tax, the property’s basis for income tax purposes 
remains the frequently lower cost to the decedent-donor, so that 
upon a sale of the property at the estate tax valuation, there is also 
an income tax to be paid.
17. When loss on the sale of property is disallowed by reason of the relation 
of the parties, the subsequent basis of the property for purpose of 
determining gain should be the tranferor’s basis.
Section 24 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that, in 
computing net income, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of 
losses from sales or exchanges of property directly or indirectly, 
(a) between members of a family; (b) between an individual and 
a corporation in which he owns (actually or constructively) more 
than fifty per cent of the outstanding stock; (c) between two cor­
porations when more than fifty per cent of the outstanding stock 
of each is owned by or for the same individual; and, in the case of 
trusts, between (d) grantor and fiduciary, (e) beneficiary and 
fiduciary of trusts, or (f) trusts themselves, if created by the same 
grantor.
Under present law, if the purchaser in such a transaction 
thereafter sells at a price higher than he paid, though less than 
the transferor’s cost, taxable gain results. This offends the general 
principle, applied in many other sections of the Code, that trans­
actions resulting in no recognized gain or loss shall not affect the 
tax basis of the property.
The Code should be amended to provide that the rule appli­
cable to gifts be applied to such properties and that, for the pur­
pose of determining gain, the cost or other basis of the transferor 
be the basis to the transferee, but for the purpose of determining 
losses the basis be limited to the value at the date of transfer. The 
amendment should also provide that the holding period under sec­
tion 117 of the Code, in case of gain, shall include the holding 
period of the transferor.
18. In the case of employees’ stock purchase options, there should be treated 
as compensation income to the employee an amount equal to the spread 
between the option price and the market value at the time the option 
right becomes the property of the employee or at the time the employee 
may first exercise the option, or at the time of exercise or sale of the
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option, whichever is the lesser, but in no event should such amount ex­
ceed the proceeds of sale of the option, if sold. Such compensation in­
come should not be included in taxable income until the employee sells 
the stock or option, provided the option price is approximately equal to 
the fair market value of the stock on the date of the option agreement.
The practice of granting to officers and other employees op­
tions to purchase or subscribe for shares of stock in the employer 
corporation has frequently been used as an incentive. Such em­
ployee participation in ownership, with a resulting more direct 
interest in the success of the corporation, should be encouraged. 
The rule applied under existing regulations
“is that an employee exercising an option to purchase stock 
from his employer corporation receives taxable income at the 
time the option is exercised to the extent of the difference 
between the market value of the stock at the time of exercise 
and the option (or purchase) price. The difference is taxed 
as ordinary income, rather than as a capital gain, on the theory 
that it represents additional compensation to the employee. 
Since the employee does not realize cash income at the time 
the option is exercised, the imposition of a tax at that time 
often works a real hardship. An immediate sale of a portion 
of the stock acquired under the option may be necessary in 
order to finance the payment of the tax. This, of course, re­
duces the effectiveness of the employee stock option as an in­
centive device.” (See H. R. Rep. 2087, p. 4, 80th Congress, 2nd 
Session.)
There should not be taxed to the employee as compensation 
income more than the amount which is actually realized by the 
employee and is attributable to the benefit given to the employee 
by the option. Accordingly, the compensation income should be 
limited to the difference between the option or purchase price and 
the market value of the stock at the time the option right becomes 
the property of the employee (which date is frequently later than 
the date of the option agreement). Furthermore, such compensa­
tion income should not exceed the difference between the option 
or purchase price and the market value of the stock at the time the 
option is exercised, and, in no event, should it exceed the proceeds 
from the sale of the option, if sold. Any subsequent increase in 
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value of the option or of the stock should be treated, upon ultimate 
disposition of the option or the stock, as a capital gain. The basis 
for the option should be the amount determined to be compensation 
income.
In order to induce the employee to retain his stake in the busi­
ness for a substantial interval, the portion of the gain which is to 
be treated as compensation income should not be taxed until the 
ultimate realization of the income by sale of the stock or the option.
If the employee dies before the stock or option is sold, then, 
under Section 126 of the Code, upon later sale of the stock or option 
by the estate or heir, the seller would be subject to tax upon the 
compensation element to the same extent as if the sale had been 
made by the decedent. If during his lifetime the employee makes 
a gift of the stock or the option, the compensation element should 
be taxed to the employee to the same extent as if he had made a 
sale.
In order to prevent abuse, the amendments should apply only 
to cases where the option price is not less than, say, 25 per cent 
below the fair market value of the stock on the date of the option 
agreement. If the option price is more than 25 per cent below such 
fair market value, the entire spread should be included in taxable 
income on the date of the option agreement.
The deduction allowable to the employer corporation for the 
compensation element should not be postponed beyond the date 
that the option right becomes the property of the employee. The 
principle of deferring the taxability of income to the employee, 
while permitting the deduction of compensation to the employer 
corporation, is not inconsistent with other provisions of the Code 
relating to deferred compensation.
19. Section 122(d)(5) provides (for taxpayers other than corporations) for 
allowance of losses in the computation of net operating loss deduction 
only if they are attributable to the operation of a trade or business regu­
larly carried on by the taxpayer. The Section should be amended to pro­
vide for recognition in the computation of net operating loss deduction 
of losses on disposal of assets used in a trade or business by a non­
corporate taxpayer. Such losses on sales by the estate of a deceased tax­
payer, and operating losses by the estate in conducting business, should 
be allowed as carry-backs to taxable years of the deceased.
In IT 3711 the Treasury Department ruled on the matter of 
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computation of net operating loss deduction of an individual tax­
payer who sold at a loss several parcels of real estate operated by 
her as a source of income. The Department held that such losses 
were deductible in full by the taxpayer as ordinary losses since the 
assets constituted property used in trade or business. However it 
held that the losses were not includible in computation of net oper­
ating loss deduction (except to the extent of non-business gross 
income) on the grounds that while the taxpayer was in the business 
of operating real estate, she was not in the business of selling real 
estate. The courts have taken the same position on several occa­
sions.
It seems reasonable to maintain that operating a business 
comprehends purchasing and selling the related assets, and that 
losses on sale of such assets are business losses, even if all of the 
assets are sold and the taxpayer ceases to conduct business. Such 
losses are presently allowable in determining net operating loss for 
corporate taxpayers. Section 122(d)(5) should be amended by 
striking out the words "the operation of” so that the section 
would not apply to any deduction attributable to a trade or business 
regularly carried on by the taxpayer.
Section 122 should also be amended to allow a net operating 
loss deduction on operation and sale of assets by the estate of a 
deceased taxpayer, to be a carry-back to taxable years of the de­
ceased for the period provided for by the Section.
These amendments should be effective retroactively for all open 
years.
In support of the asserted position, it should be noted that the 
report of the Committee on Ways and Means, in amplification of 
the non-business bad debt provision of the 1942 Act, stated that 
‘‘a loss incurred in liquidating a business is a proximate incident 
to the conduct of a business.”
20. Recommendations with respect to personal holding companies.
(a) Effectuation of deficiency dividends by consent dividend proce­
dure should be authorized.
Often the finances of the corporation at the time of determina­
tion of a personal holding company tax deficiency are such that the 
payment of a cash dividend to take up the prior deficiency is not 
possible without seriously disturbing the corporation’s financial 
status. Such a cash deficiency dividend is utterly impossible where 
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the corporation has previously been liquidated. This can be reme­
died by amending the statute to permit the application of the con­
sent dividend provisions to deficiency dividends.
(b) Deficiency dividend procedure should not be denied in cases of 
non-fraudulent delinquency in filing personal holding company 
tax returns.
The provisions of Section 506(f) denying the benefit of the 
deficiency dividend credit if the final determination of deficiency 
contains a finding that any part of the deficiency is due to fraud 
with intent to evade tax, or failure to file the return within the 
proper time, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable 
cause and not to willful neglect, should be modified and confined 
to fraud cases. In many cases personal holding company tax re­
turns have, inadvertently and innocently, not been filed, either be­
cause of ignorance, or because of failure to recognize the effect of 
certain technical provisions, or because of changes in administra­
tive or judicial interpretation of the provisions defining personal 
holding companies. In some cases changes made by Internal Rev­
enue Agents have caused taxpayers to fall within the personal 
holding company classifications when clearly, prior to such 
changes, the filing of personal holding company returns would not 
have been required. In many such cases, the Commissioner of In­
ternal Revenue has been sustained in his claim that the taxpayer 
has not shown that the failure to file the return on time was due 
to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, including cases 
where the fault, if any, lay with the taxpayer’s adviser and not 
with the taxpayer.
Because the cases involving delinquency penalties as a general 
rule are not serious and involve no element of fraud, the further 
penalty of a denial of the right to the deficiency dividend credit 
is unjust. The aggregate penalties might well exceed the fraud 
penalty in the case of an ordinary corporation. Hence, it is urged 
that the provisions of Section 506(f) be limited to cases in which 
all or part of the deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax.
(c) The deduction of the federal income tax, in computing undis­
tributed subchapter A net income, should be clearly stated to be 
the tax for the taxable year, whether the corporation is on the 
cash basis or the accrual basis.
Under present law the deduction allowed for federal income 
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tax, in computing undistributed subchapter A net income, is the 
tax paid or accrued during the taxable year, depending on the tax­
payer’s method of accounting. In the case of a cash basis corpora­
tion the deduction is for any such taxes actually paid during the 
taxable year, generally consisting of the tax for the immediately 
preceding year and/or any deficiencies paid for still earlier years. 
In the case of such a cash basis corporation, which is either newly 
formed, or which had no income tax for the preceding year, the 
total tax can and frequently does exceed 100 per cent: e.g., on a 
$100,000 net income (undistributed), to a cash basis taxpayer the 
income tax would be $38,000 and the personal holding company tax 
$84,800, or a total of $122,800.
21. The present double taxation of corporate income—once to the earning 
corporation, and again to the stockholders upon distribution of such 
income as dividends—should be mitigated and eventually eliminated. 
This double taxation has two aspects: (a) tax on intercorporate divi­
dends and (b) tax on dividends paid to non-corporate shareholders with­
out credit either to the corporation or to the shareholder. The tax on 
intercorporate dividends should be eliminated. Non-corporate share­
holders should be allowed a credit against individual income tax of a 
percentage of dividend income equal to the initial combined rate of 
normal tax and surtax on individuals, such credit not to exceed the tax, 
otherwise determined, after applying the credits provided in Sections 31 
and 32 but before applying the credit provided in Section 35 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.
At present, corporate income is subject to a double burden of 
tax as compared with all other types of income and particularly 
as compared with business income derived in unincorporated form, 
such as single proprietorships and partnerships. The duplicate 
taxation becomes multiple taxation where intercorporate stock­
holdings and parent-subsidiary corporations are involved, since 
the corporate income, while passing from the original earning cor­
poration to the ultimate non-corporate stockholders, is subject to 
tax in the hands of each intermediate corporation in the chain of 
stock ownership. In addition to the resulting tax inequities, this 
condition has exerted a disproportionately powerful influence on 
the selection between corporate and other forms of doing business, 
has led to unbalanced and unsound financial structures through the 
substitution of borrowings—the interest payments on which are 
deductible—for capital stock issues—the dividend payments on 
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which are not deductible—, and has either discouraged, or im­
posed a tax penalty on—economically necessary and sound parent­
subsidiary structures.
This subject, above all others in the field of tax revision, has 
been distinguished by the fact that almost universal agreement 
on the desirability of eliminating or mitigating the multiple taxa­
tion of corporate income has been at least matched by almost uni­
versal disagreement as to the best method of achieving that objec­
tive—a disagreement which several years of study and public dis­
cussion by many interested groups and individuals have failed to 
resolve. This committee recommends allowance of a credit for divi­
dends received by non-corporate shareholders as the simplest and 
most practicable approach to the problem of double taxation of 
corporate dividends. It is recognized that fiscal requirements of 
the Government may make impractical, at this time, complete elim­
ination of double taxation of dividends. This committee recom­
mends allowance of a credit, equal to the lowest bracket tax rate 
applicable to individual incomes.
The credit recommended above will be a partial solution to 
the inequitable multiple taxation of corporate income distributed 
to non-corporate shareholders.
22. The 2 per cent additional tax applicable to consolidated returns should 
be eliminated.
There is every justification for taxing an affiliated group of 
corporations as the single unit which, economically and in practical 
fact, it is. This has been recognized as sound accounting and busi­
ness practice for many years. The principle of consolidated income 
tax returns is sound because thereby the taxable income of an 
affiliated group is more clearly reflected than by separate return 
filing. If it is sound to determine the taxable income of an affili­
ated group on a consolidated basis, filing on that basis should not 
be penalized. If such filing is desirable, it should not be dis­
couraged. Determination of taxable income on the basis of the 
actual business entity—as distinguished from the artificial sep­
arate corporate entities—should not be regarded as a privilege to 
be paid for, but as a desirable objective to be encouraged, or, at 
least, not discouraged.
23. The “notch” provision under which corporate income between $25,000.00 
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and $50,000.00 is taxed at 53 per cent as compared with the 38 per cent 
applicable to income in excess of $50,000.00, should be eliminated, and 
all corporate incomes, regardless of size, taxed on a graduated rate scale 
up to $50,000.00, and at a flat rate thereafter, the rate applicable to any 
income bracket to be no greater than the flat rate.
Under the prevailing rate structure, corporations earning up 
to $25,000.00 a year pay from 21 to 25 per cent, thereafter 53 per 
cent on the next $25,000.00, and 38 per cent on the balance of the 
income. The purpose of the 53 per cent rate in the so-called 
“notch” bracket (from $25,000.00 to $50,000.00) is to produce an 
effective rate, equivalent to a flat 38 per cent on the entire income, 
for incomes exceeding $50,000.00.
The much higher rate for this segment of income is not only 
unfair but promotes corporate divisions and split-ups and con­
tributes to distortions of income. A method of gradual transition 
from the lower to the higher rates, comparable to the individual 
surtax tables, will overcome these conditions.
24. Where a corporation is formed or availed of to acquire the assets and 
become the successor, in a tax-free reorganization, of a predecessor cor­
poration, which, in pursuance of the plan, is liquidated and dissolved, 
the successor corporation should step into the “tax shoes” of the pred­
ecessor corporation for the purpose of permitting carry-back and carry­
forward of net operating losses from one to the other, and application 
of the tax benefit rule to recoveries by the successor on losses or deduc­
tions previously claimed or allowable to the predecessor, and so as to 
permit full deductibility by the successor of any payments or charges 
which would have been deductible by the predecessor had the pred­
ecessor continued in existence.
Under Sections 112 and 113 of the Code, property acquired by 
a corporation in certain types of corporate reorganization has the 
same basis for tax purposes as in the hands of the predecessor 
company. The underlying theory is that the successor steps into 
the “tax shoes” of the predecessor company. This theory, how­
ever, has not been extended beyond the basis of property except 
with respect to the status of life insurance as provided in Section 
110 of the Revenue Act of 1942. Thus, the Commissioner has not 
conceded that net operating losses of the predecessor can be car­
ried forward against income of the successor, or vice-versa. In­
terest paid on additional taxes asserted against the predecessor can 
be deducted by the successor only to the extent accrued since the 
date of the reorganization, except possibly in the case of statutory 
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mergers or consolidations. The tax benefit rules provided in Sec­
tions 22(b) (12) and 127 of the Code with respect to recoveries on 
bad debts or taxes or losses or other items previously claimed or 
allowable to the predecessor is not extended to the successor. Other 
items of expenses paid by the successor on account of the pred­
ecessor, which would have been deductible by the predecessor had 
it continued in existence, are not allowed as deductions to the suc­
cessor.
This should be corrected by providing that the successor in 
such cases succeeds to the tax status of the predecessor for the 
purposes above mentioned.
The principle asserted above should be made applicable to all 
transactions recognized as tax free under Section 112 of the In­
ternal Revenue Code, including complete liquidations of corpora­
tions under subsection 112(b)(6). The corrective amendment 
should be made applicable retroactively to all taxable years not 
barred by limitation or closing agreement.
25. For the purpose of Section 23(g)(4), which excludes from the capital 
loss category, loss from worthlessness of stock in a virtually wholly 
owned subsidiary of a domestic corporation, if more than 90 per cent 
of the subsidiary’s gross income for its entire history was from other 
than investment sources, gross income from the sale of merchandise, 
stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to customers in the 
ordinary course of the trade or business, should be defined to mean 
“gross receipts” from such sales.
Broadly speaking, it was the purpose of Section 23(g) (4) to 
permit an ordinary loss deduction for loss from worthlessness of 
stock in a bona fide operating subsidiary, with no substantial in­
vestment income. This purpose is defeated where the subsidiary’s 
operations are so disastrous that it has a gross loss on its sales, and 
therefore no gross income therefrom, since in such case an utterly 
insignificant amount of investment income would be more than 10 
per cent of the gross income and would remove the case from Sec­
tion 23(g)(4), requiring treatment of the loss as a capital loss. 
This should be remedied by defining gross income from sales, for 
this purpose, as “gross receipts” from sales. This amendment 
should be made applicable retroactively to all open years.
26. A transfer of substantially all the assets of a corporation to another 
corporation should not be disqualified as a “reorganization” under Sec­
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tion 112(g)(1)(C) merely because the voting stock received in exchange 
is that of a parent company of the transferee corporation.
In Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 and Helvering v. Bash­
ford, 302 U.S. 454, the Supreme Court held that where all the assets 
of one corporation were transferred to another company for its 
stock, and such properties were then transferred to a subsidiary 
of the company issuing the stock (or were transferred directly to 
such subsidiary in the first instance), the company issuing the 
stock was not a “party to the reorganization” and the receipt of 
its stock by the shareholders of the company whose properties 
were acquired was a taxable exchange—and not, as in most mergers, 
an exchange on which gain or loss is not recognized. Such transfers 
should qualify as tax-free reorganizations to the same extent as 
if the stock-issuing company had no subsidiary and retained the 
properties itself—the transfer to such subsidiary being purely an 
internal arrangement of the stock-issuing company. This condi­
tion can be remedied by extending the term “party to a reorgani­
zation” to include the parent corporation owning all of the stock 
of a corporation to which the properties are transferred.
27. The definition of reorganization in Section 112(g) should be broadened 
to bring within its scope “spin-off” and “split-up” transfers.
The definition of reorganization should be amended to permit 
the distribution, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, to a share­
holder of a corporation a party to the reorganization, of stock in 
such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorgani­
zation without surrender by the shareholder of stock in the dis­
tributing corporation. Enactment of this change will facilitate 
corporate readjustments by removing the present requirement that 
stock in the distributing corporation be surrendered in the course 
of such a reorganization.
The definition of a reorganization in Section 112(g) should be 
clarified to remove any doubt that an exchange, pursuant to a 
plan of reorganization, of shares in a corporation by its share­
holders for stock of two or more corporations formed to acquire 
the assets of such corporation is a reorganization.
28. Recommendations re mitigation of effect of statute of limitations.
The purpose of Section 3801 was to mitigate the effect of the 
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statute of limitations since “It was never intended that the statute 
of limitations should have the result of allowing either taxpayer or 
Commissioner to reap a double advantage from its operation by 
assuming in one year a position inconsistent with that taken in a 
barred year. ”
Section 3801, as enacted, has limited application since (1) only 
income and profits taxes under Chapter 1 and subchapters A, B, 
D and E of Chapter 2 may be involved, (2) the error and the de­
termination, as defined by Section 3801(a), must relate to the 
same type of tax as enumerated in (1) above; (3) the determina­
tion and error must relate to the situations specified in Section 
3801(b). These limitations restrict the benefits to be derived from 
this Section and do not relieve the hardship in many meritorious 
situations, those falling outside these specific types of cases con­
tinuing to rest on general principles. For example, if the Commis­
sioner shifts an item of income from a barred year to an open year, 
or a deduction from an open year to a barred year, the taxpayer 
in equity and good conscience should be entitled to a refund for the 
barred year. The Commissioner at present has no power to grant 
the refund. Another class of situation involves an adjustment for 
one taxpayer because of another taxpayer’s error.
The law should be amended to cover the following:
(1) When a deduction is made in good faith on the tax return 
of one year and is disallowed by the Commissioner on the ground 
that it was deductible in a return of a different year.
(2) When income is included by the taxpayer in good faith in 
one year and is held by the Commissioner to be taxable in another 
year.
(3) When the basis of an asset claimed by taxpayer is reduced 
by the Commissioner for the purpose of computing net income of 
one year on the ground that the reduction of the basis should have 
been made in another year.
(4) When income or deductions are included or deducted by 
one member of an affiliated group, as defined in Section 141(d), 
and are allocated by the Commissioner to another member of the 
group.
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(5) When income or deductions are included in good faith in 
the tax return of one taxpayer but are adjusted by the Commis­
sioner because of another taxpayer’s error.
(6) When income or deductions are included in good faith on 
the tax return of one taxpayer and adjustments are made by the 
Commissioner in respect to a related taxpayer under the provi­
sions of Section 45.
